President Donald Trump\u2019s announcement that the United States will temporarily ‘run’ Venezuela following the capture of Nicol\u00e1s Maduro may prove to be a defining moment for the Western Hemisphere \u2014 either a disciplined effort to restore regional stability or the opening chapter of an avoidable, open-ended entanglement.<\/p>\n
At his Mar-a-Lago press conference on Saturday, the president stated plainly, ‘We will run the country until such time as we can do a safe, proper and judicious transition.’ He added that members of his national security team standing behind him would oversee the effort and did not rule out ‘boots on the ground.’ Hours later, speaking aboard Air Force One, he sharpened the message further: ‘We\u2019re going to run it, fix it.’<\/p>\n
The strategic logic is easy to understand. Venezuela sits atop the world\u2019s largest proven oil reserves and has become a hub for narcotics trafficking, corruption and malign outside influence. The administration\u2019s December 2025 National Security Strategy explicitly embraces what it calls a ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine \u2014 pledging to deny non-hemispheric competitors such as China, Russia and Iran control over strategically vital assets in the Americas. In that framework, Venezuela is not merely a humanitarian tragedy; it is a test case.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
But this is precisely where experience should sober ambition.<\/p>\n
A central contradiction now confronts Washington. How does the United States ‘run’ Venezuela when its constitutionally designated vice president, Delcy Rodr\u00edguez, has already been sworn in domestically as interim president following Maduro\u2019s removal?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Rodr\u00edguez\u2019s claim to authority \u2014 backed by Venezuela\u2019s Supreme Tribunal of Justice and regime-loyal institutions \u2014 is rejected by Washington as illegitimate. Yet in practical terms, ministries, security forces and regional authorities inside Venezuela remain staffed by officials loyal to the old system. That means the United States is not governing Venezuela in name, law or day-to-day administration \u2014 even as presidential rhetoric suggests otherwise.<\/p>\n
This disconnect between declared authority and actual control is where post-conflict operations often fail.<\/p>\n
I learned that lesson firsthand. In 2002 and 2003, I served as a member of then\u2013Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld\u2019s Military Analyst Group. We were given extensive access \u2014 briefings, travel and candid discussions with officials planning both the Iraq invasion and what would follow.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
In early 2003, several of us met with retired officers outlining postwar governance plans. We asked basic but essential questions: Who would secure ministries? How would local governance function? How would electricity, water and fuel distribution be restored? The answers were often vague, more aspirational than operational.<\/p>\n